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Abstract
Background: Priority setting and resource allocation in healthcare organizations often involves the balancing of
competing interests and values in the context of hierarchical and politically complex settings with multiple
interacting actor relationships. Despite this, few studies have examined the influence of actor and power dynamics
on priority setting practices in healthcare organizations. This paper examines the influence of power relations
among different actors on the implementation of priority setting and resource allocation processes in public
hospitals in Kenya.
Methods: We used a qualitative case study approach to examine priority setting and resource allocation practices
in two public hospitals in coastal Kenya. We collected data by a combination of in-depth interviews of national
level policy makers, hospital managers, and frontline practitioners in the case study hospitals (n = 72), review of
documents such as hospital plans and budgets, minutes of meetings and accounting records, and non-participant
observations in case study hospitals over a period of 7 months. We applied a combination of two frameworks,
Norman Long’s actor interface analysis and VeneKlasen and Miller’s expressions of power framework to examine and
interpret our findings
Results: The interactions of actors in the case study hospitals resulted in socially constructed interfaces between: 1)
senior managers and middle level managers 2) non-clinical managers and clinicians, and 3) hospital managers and
the community. Power imbalances resulted in the exclusion of middle level managers (in one of the hospitals) and
clinicians and the community (in both hospitals) from decision making processes. This resulted in, amongst others,
perceptions of unfairness, and reduced motivation in hospital staff. It also puts to question the legitimacy of priority
setting processes in these hospitals.
Conclusions: Designing hospital decision making structures to strengthen participation and inclusion of relevant
stakeholders could improve priority setting practices. This should however, be accompanied by measures to
empower stakeholders to contribute to decision making. Strengthening soft leadership skills of hospital managers
could also contribute to managing the power dynamics among actors in hospital priority setting processes.
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Background
Given the scarcity of resources, priority setting and re-
source allocation (PSRA) has emerged as a key health
system challenge [1–3]. PSRA is particularly challenging
in developing countries, where the gap between health-
care needs and available resources is wide. The judicious
use of resources through appropriate PSRA has there-
fore been considered a key determinant of health system
performance [4].
PSRA in healthcare often involves the balancing of
competing interests and values in the context of hier-
archical and politically complex settings with multiple
interacting actor relationships [1]. In such settings, the
capacity of different actors to participate effectively in
PSRA processes is often influenced by the power dynam-
ics manifested in their relationships [1]. Power - defined
as the ability to influence others - is typically derived
from varied sources including positional authority, pro-
fessional status, knowledge and skills, control over re-
sources and physical abilities [5–7]. Power in its various
forms tends to manifest itself in such highly political
processes such as PRSA. In his seminal work, Steven
Lukes (1974) describes what he calls the three dimen-
sions of power [8, 9]. The one dimensional view sees
power as the ability of one actor to get another actor to
do something they do not want to do. Power in the first
dimension is therefore embodied in “concrete decisions”
[8, 9]. The second dimension considers “what does not
happen” or is “hidden” from decision-making settings
and includes the deliberate and conscious exclusion of
issues from the agenda. Power is hence exercised
through control of the agenda [8, 9]. In the third dimen-
sion of power, Lukes argues that power can also operate
at a deeper more invisible level [8, 9]. The third dimen-
sion of power consists of political socialization that is
deeply ingrained such that actors unwittingly follow the
dictates of power even against their best interests [8, 9].
In this paper, we examine power in all its three dimen-
sions. While top down models of implementation view
power as the control of actors by those with authority at
the higher levels of a bureaucracy, bottom up models
focus on the micro- practices of power and actor
dynamics between and within organizations [10]. By
micro-practices, we mean the manifestations of power
from the detailed actions and interactions of actors at
the frontline of the system (service delivery interface),
rather than higher up the system.
While power has been shown to be influential in
health policy formulation and implementation [10–12],
the influence of power in PSRA processes has seldom
been explored in the literature [12]. This is surprising,
given that PSRA processes are inherently political, in-
volving a range of actors arbitrating between competing
needs and interests [13]. Further, politics has been
proposed as a key frame or lens through which organiza-
tions (such as hospitals) can be examined and under-
stood [7]. The political frame views organizations as
turbulent arenas where ongoing contests of actor inter-
ests play out [7]. From this perspective, every significant
organizational process is inherently political [7]. From
the political frame, the most important decisions in
organizations involve allocating scarce resources [7].
Scarcity of resources and enduring differences put con-
flict at the center of day-to-day dynamics within organi-
zations and make power the most important asset [7].
In this paper, we present findings of case study re-
search to examine the influence of power and actor
dynamics on priority setting practices in first referral
public hospitals, known as county hospitals, in Kenya.
Kenya has a devolved system of governance, with a
central government and 47 semi-autonomous units
called counties [14]. Under this new governance struc-
ture, the health system is structured such that the cen-
tral Ministry of Health (MOH) has policy making and
regulatory roles while responsibilities such as allocation
and managing health care resources and service
provision are held by county health systems [14]. The
healthcare delivery system is organized into four tiers,
namely community, primary care, county referral and
national referral. Community health services include all
community based demand creation activities that are
guided by the Kenyan Ministry of Health (MOH) com-
munity strategy [15, 16]. Primary healthcare include
services provided by public and private maternity homes,
health centers and dispensaries. County referral services
include first level referral hospitals that are managed by
a given county. These are referred to as county hospitals
and are the focus of this study. National referral services
are comprised of national level facilities, where tertiary
referral services are provided.
This paper makes a contribution to the literature on
the influence of power in policy implementation by ex-
ploring how micro-practices of power shape PSRA prac-
tices at the meso level of the health system, county
hospitals in Kenya. This paper adopts a bottom-up
approach in exploring the practices of power in imple-
mentation using a case study design to explore the
sources, nature and manifestations of power and its
influence on the implementation of PSRA processes in
these settings.
Methods
This paper is based on the analysis of data collected as
part of a wider study conducted to describe and evaluate
PSRA practices in first referral public hospitals (county
hospitals) in Kenya. The case study approach was
employed given its appropriateness in examining com-
plex social phenomena [17, 18]. Two county hospitals
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were purposely selected as cases for the study. The
number (2) was informed by the need to conduct an in-
depth study within the available resources and time-
frame. Two hospital cases were selected purposefully
guided by the following criteria: 1) 1st level referral hos-
pitals that were designated as county hospitals; 2) hospi-
tals with a high local resource level and those with a low
local resource level; 3) hospitals which had prior rela-
tionships our research institution. This last criterion was
important because the subject of priority setting was
likely to be viewed as political and sensitive. By identify-
ing hospitals with prior contact/relationship or linkage
with our institution, we aimed to minimize trust con-
cerns. The selection of hospital cases aimed to identify
hospitals that were rich in information – with varying
characteristics and experiences - as opposed to represen-
tativeness. To maintain confidentiality and minimize the
potential of identification of study participants, the
hospitals selected for the study will be identified as
Hospital A and B.
Within each case study hospital, we selected three
PSRA activities as nested cases for in-depth study. We
used three criteria to select priority-setting activities: 1)
availability and reliability of information; 2) a clearly
defined beginning and end to the activity; and 3) full
consent to examine the priority-setting case from the
hospital. Based on these criteria, we selected the follow-
ing three PSRA activities: 1) the Hospital Budgeting and
annual work planning process; 2) medicine selection
decisions in the hospital; and 3) nursing allocation to
hospital departments in the hospital.
Data were collected by the first author (EB) who is an
experienced health systems researcher with training in
qualitative data collection and analysis methods. EB had
no prior relationship with all but 1 (former schoolmate)
the researcher participants. The participants were ver-
bally informed and provided with a written information
sheet that outlined the nature and objectives of the
study. Data were collected through a combination of in-
depth interviews with hospital managers and frontline
workers; non-participant observations over a period of
7 months; and a review of relevant documents including
hospital plans, budgets and minutes of meetings. We
used in-depth interviews to collect information about
the identified priority setting practices from the perspec-
tive and experiences of the hospital decision makers,
front line practitioners and national level informants. In
depth interviews employed topic guides that asked ques-
tions about the identity, roles, influence and interests of
actors in priority setting processes (Additional file 1).
The interviews lasted generally between 30 and 40 min
and were carried out in the case study hospitals. Inter-
views were audio recorded and supplemented by note
taking. We reviewed documents relevant to the priority
setting activities selected for the study, including the
hospital 5 year investment plan, hospital annual work
plans (AWPs), hospital quarterly budgets, and minutes
from hospital management committee (HMC), hospital
management team (HMT), executive expenditure com-
mittee (EEC) and medicines and therapeutic committee
(MTC) meetings. We also reviewed accounting records
and documents recommended by key informants as
likely to contain relevant information. These documents
were selected for two financial years (2011 – 2012 and
2012 – 2013). We used document review data abstrac-
tion guides (Additional file 1) to extract relevant data
from the selected documents. EB spent 3.5 months in
each of the case study hospitals conducting non-
participant observations. These took the form of sitting
in and observing hospital quarterly budgeting meetings,
AWP meetings, senior management meetings and medi-
cines and therapeutic committee meetings. EB also spent
time with and interacted with hospital workers, and held
informal discussions with them about priority setting
practices in the hospital. During this time, EB spent time
in key departments/offices where priority setting activ-
ities took place such as the hospital administrator’s
office, the accounts department, the pharmacy depart-
ment and the nursing department. An overt approach to
observation was adopted: that is, the hospital staff mem-
bers were aware of EB’s presence and the objectives of
the study. However, beyond brief introductions at the
start of the meetings, an unobtrusive approach to obser-
vation was employed. A free note-taking approach aided
by an observation checklist (Additional file 1) was used.
The selection of participants for interviews was pur-
posive with the aim of selecting individuals who had in-
depth knowledge of the identified PSRA activities, and
those who took part in or were affected by these PSRA
activities. This included senior and middle level hospital
managers, frontline practitioners and key informants
within the planning departments of the central ministry
of health. Participants were selected and interviewed
until saturation was reached. In total, 72 participants
were selected, 35 from Hospital A, 32 from Hospital B
and 5 from the central Ministry of Health. Table 1 out-
lines the number of participants selected for interviews
in each hospital under each category.
Application of theory
To explore power relations in the case study hospitals,
we integrated and employed two complementary frame-
works of power and actor relations. The first of these is
Long’s [19] ‘actor interface analysis’ which argues that
power dynamics often “fracture” social systems along in-
terfaces that differentiate one group from another based
on their power differences. These so-called social inter-
faces occur at points where varied and conflicting social
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fields or life-worlds intersect, forming the stage where
power dynamics become manifest. Interface analysis
aims to explicate the types and sources of social discon-
tinuity and to explore the cultural and organizational
means of transforming or reproducing them [19]. We
used this conceptualization because it allows us to iden-
tify and characterize the spaces where power relations
among actors were exercised [19–21].
Further, to examine the nature of power dynamics
that occurred at these interfaces, we employed
VeneKlasen and Miller’s [22] expressions of power
framework. This framework postulates that power is
expressed in four main forms namely: 1) power over;
2) power to; 3) power with, and; 4) power within
(Table 2) [20, 22]. An advantage of this framework is
that it recognizes positive attributes of power and al-
lows actors to view power as something positive that
they can possess [5].
Data analysis
Transcribed data were imported into NVIVO 10 for
coding and analysis. Data analysis was led by the
first author (EB), with support from all authors. Data
were analyzed using a modified framework (the-
matic) approach. This approach was adopted so as
to provide findings and interpretations that are rele-
vant to policy and also to provide pragmatic recom-
mendations. However the approach was modified to
include an initial open coding step to allow for
emergence of important themes which might not
have been captured in the study’s theoretical frame-
works (Additional file 2). Even though the coding
was carried out by EB, peer debriefing with all the
other authors/researchers was carried out to help re-
duce the possibility of bias. Coded and charted data
were critically examined under each thematic cat-
egory. Interpretation of the data entailed identifying
key concepts and explaining relationships between
these key concepts. Also, it entailed explaining rela-
tionships between the data and theoretical assump-
tions and identifying messages that are relevant to
policy makers. Rigor and trustworthiness were
enhanced by a combination of 1) use of theory, 2) use
of multiple rather than single case study, 3) prolonged
engagement (7 months) during data collection, 4)
methodological triangulation, and 5) member check-
ing, which entailed discussing the preliminary findings
and interpretations with study participants to verify
the validity of our interpretations.
Results
Far from being a harmonious milieu, the interactions of
actors in the case study hospitals resulted in socially
constructed interfaces between: 1) senior managers and
middle level managers 2) non-clinical managers and
clinicians, and 3) hospital managers and the community.
Within each interface, we explore actor interactions,
highlighting micro-practices of power, the power they
possess, how this power is exercised and how this influ-
ences PSRA processes.
Senior managers and middle level managers
The case study hospitals had two management commit-
tees namely the hospital management team (HMT) and
the executive expenditure committee (EEC). The HMT
included middle level and senior hospital managers and
reported to the EEC, which included senior level man-
agers only. These managers (senior and middle level)
were professionals who had been assigned management
duties. The professionals who take on the responsibility
of managing professional work, professional colleagues
and other staff have sometimes been referred to as
hybrid managers [23]. The hospitals did not have clear
guidelines on either the roles or the exact composition
of the two decision making committees, and neither had
an official organogram. In the absence of clarity on roles
and composition, these structures and their functioning
evolved quite differently in the two case study hospitals.
For example, while the Hospital accountant and the hos-
pital pharmacist were considered senior managers and
therefore sat in the EEC in Hospital A, they were not
Table 1 Number of participants selected in each hospital under
each category
National-level
key informants
5 (all male)
Hospital A Hospital B
Senior managers 6 (2 female, 4 male) 6 (2 female, 4 male)
Mid-level managers 22 (13 male, 9 female) 19 (11 male, 7 female)
Front-line
practitioners
7 (3 male, 4 female) 8 (4 male, 4 female)
Hospital sub-total 35 (18 male, 17 female) 32 (17 male, 15 female)
Study total 72 (40 male, 32 female)
Table 2 Four expressions and sources of power
Forms of
power
Definition
Power over Power over is exercised by taking it (power) from
someone else and using it to dominate and prevent
others from gaining it
Power with Power with is exercised by finding common ground
among different interests and building collective strength
Power to act Power to act refers to the capacity for individuals and
groups to shape their life and world and create more
equitable relations and structures of power
Power
within
Power within refers to individuals’ sense of self-worth,
values and self-knowledge which is central to individual
and group understanding of being citizens with rights
and responsibilities’
Barasa et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2016) 16:536 Page 4 of 13
considered senior managers and hence only sat in the
HMT in Hospital B. Further, while the nursing depart-
ment was represented in the HMT by the head of the
nursing department in Hospital B, the nursing depart-
ment was represented in Hospital A’s HMT by the head
of department and all the nursing-in-charges of each of
the wards in the hospital. Also, while the EEC was con-
sidered to be the ultimate decision making body with
regard to the Hospital Budget in Hospital A, in Hospital
B the equivalent was the HMT. Thus, hospital managers
are seen to exercise discretionary power to develop
hospital guidelines on the roles and composition of deci-
sion making committees, with differing results.
In both case study hospitals, the authority vested in
the position of senior managers meant that they exer-
cised power over the middle level managers. The in-
teractions between these groups of managers resulted
in a social interface where power dynamics were
manifested, as observed particularly in the budgeting
process. However, how this power was exercised dif-
fered between the two case study hospitals, as will be
argued below.
Interactions between Senior and Middle Level Managers
in Hospital A
In Hospital A, the dominant group of actors in the
budgeting and planning processes was the EEC. This
committee made the actual allocation decisions and
developed final budgets for the hospital. The interface
between senior and middle level managers in this
hospital was therefore characterized by a power imbal-
ance in favor of the senior managers, who derived and
exercised their power over middle level managers in a
number of ways.
One of the sources of power of senior managers
was their control over resources. Middle level man-
agers felt that the EEC was the most powerful deci-
sion making body given that they made the actual
allocation decisions:
“Those [EEC] are the people who actually allocate
resources. Once you have that power to allocate
resources then you are the most powerful person and
you are actually the one who is planning for the whole
hospital.” Middle level manager, Hospital A
Senior managers also derived their power from their
positions of authority. The medical superintendent (who
was the hospital chief executive), the hospital matron
(who was the head of the nursing department), the
Hospital administrative officer (who was the head of the
administrative staff and non-clinical departments) and
the Hospital accountant therefore had significant power
by virtue of their positions as senior managers in the
hospital. Senior managers therefore exercised power over
the middle level managers:
“People can argue and argue but what the medical
superintendent says is final because he is the boss. If
he says he will give you fifty thousand shillings that is
what you will get.” Middle level manager, Hospital A
“I think the matron has more powers than other
managers…because of her position…the HAO
[Hospital Administrative officer] also has a lot of
power because he is the one that calls for and chairs
the meetings.” Middle level manager, Hospital A
In addition to power over, one of the senior managers
in Hospital A, the hospital matron, further derived her
power from mobilizing the nursing staff represented in
the HMT to support her proposals. She had incorpo-
rated all the nursing ward in-charges in the HMT which
resulted in the nursing department having the highest
number of representatives in the committee. The hos-
pital matron therefore exercised power with the other
nursing ward in-charges to exert greater influence over
allocation decisions:
“The matron has more power because she has the
numbers and is more eloquent……the nurses can be
able to make a lot of noise and their proposal is
considered, but you are only a single person.” Middle
level manager, Hospital A
Senior managers in Hospital A are seen to exercise
power by directly influencing the decision making
processes. In addition to these visible forms of
power, senior managers in Hospital A also exercised
hidden forms of power through their ability to con-
trol the decision making agenda. Specifically, they
restricted HMT meetings to merely presenting
budgetary requests, and deferred the actual budget-
ary allocation decisions to the EEC. While the HMT
held meetings to present budgetary requirements
from different hospital departments, the medical
superintendent who chaired the meeting always di-
rected that actual budgeting and allocation decisions
would be made in the EEC.
“We [HMT] don’t make decisions…you saw what
happens in those meetings. We talk and talk and in
the end the decisions are always deferred to the
smaller committee [EEC].” Middle level manager,
Hospital A
The power differences between senior and middle
level managers in Hospital A were also manifested in
the nature of interactions between these two groups
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during the HMT meetings. We observed that the se-
nior managers were more vocal, while the middle
level managers hardly participated in the discussions.
We also observed that the organization of the meet-
ings as well as agenda setting was carried out by se-
nior managers only (the Hospital administrative
officer, the Hospital accountant and medical superin-
tendent) with no involvement of middle level man-
agers. From our observations of how meetings were
conducted, the senior managers sat at a table in front
of the room (high table) facing middle level managers
who sat in seats arranged in rows (as in a classroom).
During the meetings, there was hardly any deliber-
ation and middle level managers appeared reluctant
to engage and participate in discussion. Views of
senior managers carried the day and the middle level
managers were expected to accept decisions without
questioning them.
“It is as if we [middle level managers] don’t matter,
they [senior managers] call the meetings, they talk and
talk and we just listen. Even if any of us [middle level
managers] says anything, it is not taken into
consideration.” Middle level manager, Hospital A
The power imbalance between senior and middle level
managers was exacerbated by the fact that two senior
managers not only appeared to wield power but also
used it for personal advantage. These two senior man-
agers exercised significant influence over hospital deci-
sion making. For example, we observed that they had
side (informal) meetings before and after each formal
decision making meeting, where they agreed on their
preferred outcome of the formal meeting. In practice,
decisions were made in these side meetings rather than
the formal meetings. These two managers therefore
seemed to exercise power with to exert influence over
hospital PSRA decisions.
“These are very sensitive issues I think he [the
medical superintendent] should handle…I think he
is overpowered by those two you know when they
are the two they support each other.” Middle level
manager, Hospital A
It was felt by the other hospital managers that these
two senior managers derived power from having
access to crucial information needed for planning and
budgeting.
“They (the two senior managers) are important given
that they have information which is useful for
budgeting and planning…for example they have
information about finances…they are very important
members such that if we plan a meeting and they do
not come, it will be very difficult to do budgeting and
planning.” Middle level manager, Hospital A
Middle level managers felt that these two senior
managers favored their own departments and those
of managers with whom they enjoyed good relations.
The priority setting process was therefore perceived
to unfair. The power enjoyed by these two managers
was such that middle level managers felt to have a
chance of success, funding proposals needed their
support.
“They [the two senior managers] decide who gets
what…mostly it is their departments and their friends’
departments that benefit…it is not fair at all.” Middle
level manager, Hospital A
“Most of the time you bring up an issue or propose an
idea and if those two [senior managers] are not on
your side, trust me it won’t go through, it is as simple
as that, so the two of them basically have to back an
idea and the medical superintendent does not do
anything about it....I think he is just overwhelmed.”
Middle level manager, Hospital A
At the interface between senior and middle level man-
agers in Hospital A, the power differences resulted in
frustration and reduced motivation among middle level
managers. We observed, and indeed was reported by
respondents, that the frustration manifested itself in
reduced attendance and participation in HMT meetings
among middle level managers.
“Why should we [middle level managers] attend the
[budgeting] meetings? Just to rubberstamp their
decisions? You attended them…did you see that
most of us don’t attend? We are frustrated…and
even if we attend, we don’t talk much, because our
points are not considered.” Middle level manager,
Hospital A
It also created an atmosphere of suspicion and re-
duced trust between the middle level managers and se-
nior managers. Middle level managers in Hospital A felt
that the budgeting process was not transparent and sus-
pected that some of the senior managers took advantage
of the process and perpetrated corruption.
“There is something going on there…you cannot
trust some of them [senior managers]. I think they
don’t want us to be very involved in the process
[budgeting] because they don’t want us to know
what they are hiding.” Middle level manager,
Hospital A
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Interactions between senior and middle level managers in
Hospital B
The power dynamics between senior and middle level
managers in Hospital B were remarkably different
from those in Hospital A. Power differences between
these two groups of managers appeared to be reduced
or “managed”. Hospital managers in this hospital felt
that this was as a result of the medical superinten-
dent’s initiative to ensure PSRA in the hospital was
an inclusive and consultative process. The medical
superintendent in this hospital exercised her power to
and power over to ensure that all managers were in-
cluded in the decision making process. Unlike Hos-
pital A, the hospital budget was deliberated on and
finalized in the HMT at Hospital B. The medical
superintendent felt that it was only by developing the
budget at the HMT level that all managers - senior
and middle level - would understand and accept the
outcome of the process.
“We try to make sure that all managers are
involved in the budgeting process. If the budget is
developed by the HMT, then every manager gets a
chance to contribute. This way they understand
how difficult it is to develop the budget and they
understand why they cannot always get what they
ask for.” Medical superintendent, Hospital B
We observed that the atmosphere in the budgeting
meetings in Hospital B was less tense than in Hos-
pital A and all managers, whether senior or middle
level, felt free to speak out. As a result, middle level
managers felt included in the decision making
process and thought that the process was fair. The
suspicion that accompanied the budgeting and re-
source allocation process in Hospital A was absent
in Hospital B.
“We [hospital managers] are usually involved in the
budgeting process and so there is nothing to hide. All
the money collected is announced in the HMT and we
decide how to spend it. The process is transparent.”
Middle level manager, Hospital B
Non-clinical managers and clinicians
Another interface where power differences played
out in PSRA practices was between hospital man-
agers in general (hospital administration) and clini-
cians. In both case study hospitals, clinicians did
not participate in budgeting and planning activities
for the hospital. The EEC and HMT in both hospi-
tals comprised of non-clinical managers except for
the medical superintendent. Even though clinical
departments such as obstetrics and gynecology and
pediatrics were headed by clinician managers, these
departments were represented in these meetings by
the nurses rather than the clinician managers.
Senior managers felt that one of the reasons
clinicians did not participate in budgeting and
planning meetings was that they were not inter-
ested in participating in management or adminis-
trative activities given their focus on their clinical
responsibilities.
“The doctors are just not interested in hospital
management issues. They know when we plan for the
meetings but they don’t show up because they prefer to
be in the wards and the clinics.” Senior manager,
Hospital B
On closer examination, it appeared that one of
the major contributors to non-participation of clini-
cians was professional identity. Clinicians in both
hospitals did not seem to think that managerial re-
sponsibilities such as budgeting and planning were
part of their roles as professionals. They identified
themselves more with their clinical roles and con-
sidered time spent doing managerial duties as
“wasted time”.
“To be honest, I have never attended the annual
work plan meetings….I just feel that that my work
is to see patients and not to sit in meetings….so I
focus more on that.” Frontline clinician, Hospital A
“Most of us [doctors] don’t really see our role in all
these management meetings…that is the work of the
managers. We don’t see that as working so we are
more at home with seeing the patients.” Frontline
clinician, Hospital B
Both senior managers and clinicians felt that the
shortage of clinical staff also contributed to the
non-participation of clinicians in budgeting and
planning meetings.
“It is just because of time. I am the only
anesthetist in this hospital. And there are always,
you know, emergencies popping up here and there.
So you find that there is a management meeting
planned but I still can’t attend because I am
attending to an emergency”, Frontline clinician,
Hospital B
This reason was also perhaps not totally honest
given that clinicians did not spend all of their time in
the hospital but rather dedicated a significant propor-
tion of it to personal/private practice either in their
own clinics or neighboring private clinics. They therefore
had very little time left to attend to PSRA activities in the
hospitals.
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“All these doctors locum in private clinics. The senior
ones in fact have their own private clinics in town. So
they don‘t want to come for budgeting meetings
because it will eat on their time for their private
practice.” Middle level manager, Hospital A
“They [the doctors] have two jobs, here and in the
private hospitals. So they cannot find time to
participate in hospital management because they are
busy making money in the private hospitals.” Middle
level manager, Hospital B
However, clinicians in both hospitals reported that one of
the main reasons they did not participate in PSRA
activities was because they were not invited to participate.
“We [doctors] don’t get invited to most of these
meetings….you just come to hear that there was a
meeting and budgets were allocated…maybe if I am
invited I might find time to attend some of the
meetings” Frontline clinician, Hospital A
It was also evident from their responses that they had
poor knowledge of the PSRA activities that take place in
the hospital. For example, clinicians interviewed were gen-
erally unaware of the decision making structures in the hos-
pital such as the HMT, EEC and HMC. Clinicians felt that
they were excluded from PSRA activities and that these ac-
tivities were controlled by a “clique” of hospital managers:
“I have never attended an annual operational
planning meeting, either because of, you know,
sometimes you are not even aware there is a meeting
going on, because it seems like there is a certain clique
of people who are always involved in those meetings.”
Frontline clinician, Hospital A
Over time, because of this exclusion, clinicians in both
hospitals had come to accept their non-participation as the
norm. Hospital Administrators hence appeared to exercise
invisible power over PSRA processes such that clinicians
had come to believe that it was not part of their role or
their right to participate in these processes.
“To be honest the reason why I have not attended
some of these meetings is because I have not seen
my fellow colleagues attending the meeting. My
senior colleagues…because when you report to a
certain institution sometimes you tend to do what
people do, you follow the norms.” Frontline
clinician, Hospital B
In both hospitals, clinicians appeared to exert more
influence over the medicine selection decisions. This
was because these decisions required expert knowledge
on medicines that the non-clinical managers did not
have. For decisions that required clinical knowledge,
clinicians were able to exercise their power derived from
technical knowledge.
“Of course the clinicians have an influence. They are
the guys who prescribe medicines. Sometimes different
clinicians have different preferences for medicines to
use for certain conditions. Take me for instance. If I
am treating a certain condition, out of experience I
know this drug works much better than the other drugs
so I’ll request for it to be stocked by the pharmacy.”
Senior manager, Hospital A
“The doctors determine what medicines the
pharmacist will buy. This is because they deal with the
patients and so they know what medicines the patients
need. So they tell the pharmacist to stock the
medicines that they think are needed by their
patients.” Frontline clinicians, Hospital B
At the interface between non-clinical hospital man-
agers and clinicians, the key outcome is the exclu-
sion of clinicians from hospital PSRA processes, with
the exception of the medicines selection process. In
both case hospitals, this exclusion was thought to
result in the misrepresentation of clinical priorities.
Further, clinicians thought they had more legitimacy
in making priority setting decisions by virtue of their
expertise and clinical roles, compared to non-clinician
managers.
“Some of the things are dealt with by the office of the
administrator…since he is not a clinician he does not
understand what we go through.” Frontline clinician,
Hospital B
Perhaps more importantly, the non-participation of
clinicians in PSRA activities meant that only the values
of one set of actors (hospital managers; non-clinicians)
were influential in decision making. Partly because of
the socialization from professional (non-clinical) back-
ground and also because of their knowledge (or lack
thereof ), non- clinical managers placed more value on
considerations that had administrative importance. For
example, in deciding whether or not to fund a proposal,
they were more concerned about whether the hospital
could afford to fund the activity, and whether the activity
had the potential to generate revenues that could add to
the hospital resource envelope, than about whether the
service would meet the healthcare needs of the commu-
nity served by the hospital.
“The hospital generates very little money which means
priorities have to change…So first we want to make
money, we allocate where we can make money.” Senior
manager, Hospital B
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The managers thus operated under a fiscal-managerial
decision system [24], as opposed to clinicians’ greater
concern about the needs of the patients (regardless of
whether they were paying patients or not) and their abil-
ity to deliver health care services to these needy patients.
Clinicians were also generally more concerned about
whether services were effective and of good quality,
suggesting they operate under a medical-individualistic
decision system [24].
“All they [non-clinical managers] think about is
money, money, money…they don’t look at the patient
perspective…what the patient needs…quality of care…I
think these should be a priority. But they [non-clinical
managers] think more of how to raise revenues.”
Frontline clinicians, Hospital B
With clinicians excluded from decision making pro-
cesses, the fiscal–managerial value system dominated
PSRA decisions. The dominance of non-clinical manager
values resulted in the prominence of the revenue gener-
ating potential as a criterion for PSRA in both case study
hospitals. Departments or service areas that generated
more revenues from user fees received more resources
while those that were poor at revenue generation re-
ceived little or no resources. This resulted in arguably
inequitable allocation of hospital resources [25].
“Since I am allocated a small budget I only procure
medicines that I can sell, I cannot buy medicines for
children under 5 years because they don’t pay for
services.” Middle level manager, Hospital A
Hospital managers and the community
Interactions between hospital managers and the com-
munity also provided a platform for the exercise of
power. In both case study hospitals, PSRA activities
were undertaken by hospital staff either as individuals
(in the case of nursing allocation and medicine selec-
tion) or as committees (the HMT and the EEC) with-
out any community representation. Hospital managers
derived their power relative to community members
from a number of sources. First, hospital managers
had positional authority (they had been appointed by
the government to positions with clear influence over
hospital management) while the community had no
clear role or authority in hospital management issues.
Second, hospital managers had control over hospital
resources. Third, hospital managers had better access
to hospital information than community members.
Hospital managers in both hospitals felt that it
would be difficult to include community members in
hospital PSRA meetings because they did not possess
the technical capacity to contribute effectively.
“The problem with community members here is that
most of them are uneducated. It is difficult for them to
take part in decision making because they don’t have
much knowledge.” Senior manager, Hospital A
“The community members are not well trained to take
part in budgeting. It can be very difficult to involve
them in such a process.” Middle level manager,
Hospital B
It was also thought that it would be problematic to
include community members in PSRA decisions because
they would lack objectivity to make allocation decisions
and would be biased by their experiences and their
healthcare needs.
“The problem with community members is that they
only think of what affects them. If you involve them in
decision making, they might just promote things that
affect them only.” Senior manager, Hospital A
In both case study hospitals, the community was, on
paper, only represented in the hospital management
committee (HMC), which was an oversight committee
of the hospital. In both hospitals however there were
concerns about the representation of the HMC. It was
felt that the members of these committees were not
selected through fair and transparent processes but
rather based on perceived relationships with local politi-
cians or hospital senior managers.
“How are the members selected? It depends on who
they know. If you are a friend of the politicians or the
senior managers in the hospital then you are made a
HMC member.” Senior manager, Hospital A
“HMC members are cronies of local politicians.
That is how people are selected to be in HMC. It is
not a transparent process.” Senior manager,
Hospital B
These HMC members were therefore not thought
to represent community members. Further, the fact
that their selection was influenced by the hospital
managers created the potential for indebtedness.
This was because HMC members benefited by draw-
ing (financial) sitting allowances and prestige from
the position. The HMC’s oversight role also provided
them with an opportunity to access information that
would enable the committee members to influence
and/or benefit from hospital procurement processes.
It is thought that the HMC members were careful
not to go against the wishes of the hospital man-
agers so as to retain their support for membership
in the HMC.
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“They are toothless…they cannot dare challenge EEC
decisions. You see, they get meeting allowances and
they also get favors like tenders to supply the
hospital…so they don’t want to risk that.” Middle level
manager, Hospital A
Therefore, whereas on paper the community mem-
bers, through the HMC, had an oversight responsibility
over the hospital, in practice the HMC was not empow-
ered. In both hospitals, the HMC was seen as passive,
merely “rubberstamping” hospital decisions. For ex-
ample, whereas the HMC was required to review and
amend (if necessary) the budget developed by hospitals,
in practice they simply approved the budgets without
serious scrutiny.
“The HMC is toothless, they just rubberstamp
decisions. They don’t want to step on the toes of the
hospital managers because they are the ones that
influenced their selection.” Middle level manager,
Hospital A
“The committee [HMC] cannot ask any questions.
They just accept the decisions of the hospital because
they are powerless.” Middle level manager, Hospital B
At the interface between the hospital and the commu-
nity therefore, the exclusion of the community from
PSRA processes meant that community voice was not
incorporated in hospital decision making and put to
question both the responsiveness of the hospital PSRA
practices to community needs and the legitimacy of
these processes.
Discussion
The interactions between actors in the case study hospi-
tals and the micro-practices of power are seen to have
significant influence on PSRA practices. Power differ-
ences are seen to fracture the social fabric of hospital
actors along three social interfaces. We now discuss the
power dynamics within each of these interfaces, in rela-
tion to literature, and draw implications and recommen-
dations for the improvement of PSRA practices at the
meso level.
Senior managers are seen to exercise both visible and
hidden forms of power that excludes middle level man-
agers from decision making processes in one of the case
study hospitals. The important role that middle level
managers play in the implementation of organizational
policies and strategies has been recognized in literature
[26]. They have been described as the “coordinator
between daily activities of the units and the strategic ac-
tivities of the hierarchy” [27]. In the case study hospitals,
these middle level managers are responsible for the im-
plementation of hospital plans and the day to day
operations of their respective departments. Power rela-
tions between these middle level managers and senior
managers in Hospital A were however seen to influence
their performance by causing frustration and reducing
their motivation to work. This underlies the importance
of understanding power dynamics between these two
levels of management and seeking to manage it. The
power differences between hospital managers are typical
of other settings where decision making environments
are politically complex and highly hierarchical (Gibson
et al. [12]). For example, in Argentina, senior managers
with control over the hospital budget had more power
than middle level managers (Gordon et al. 2009). The
fact that the power dynamics in the second case study
hospital were well managed underlies the critical role
that leadership should play in balancing interests and
managing the power differences between different actors
(Reeleder et al. [28]). By proactively promoting a delib-
erative and inclusive PSRA process, the medical superin-
tendent in hospital B reduced the power differences
between senior and middle level managers and ensured
that both groups felt included. The outcome of her lead-
ership was a PSRA process that had increased participa-
tion, and managers that had trust in the transparency
and fairness of the process.
The power differences between clinical and non-clinical
managers (hospital administrators) resulted in the exclu-
sion of clinical managers from PSRA processes in both
case study hospitals. Of the theories used to explain this
tense relationship between clinicians and hospital man-
agers, the theory of managerial dominance over profes-
sionals in organizations perhaps resonates best with the
observations in the case study hospitals [29]. The theory
sees professionals as joining the working class, losing
control of their work and becoming the subject of the
exploitative discipline of managers who serve the ultimate
interests of the capitalist class [29]. Within healthcare,
proponents of this theory have argued that evidence of
this trend includes the observation that, firstly more and
more clinicians are salaried, rather than self-employed,
thus losing their economic independence and assuming
the wage-labor status of the working class [29]. This is
true in the public healthcare sector in Kenya where all
clinicians are salaried. Secondly, more and more clinicians
practice in bureaucratic organizations with their work
becoming subject to the control of management [29]. This
is also true in the public healthcare sector in Kenya which
is highly hierarchical and bureaucratic. Drawing from
concepts of power, managers are able to enforce their
dominance through power derived from position (author-
ity), control over resources, coercion, and control over in-
formation, amongst other influences [7]. Tensions
between clinicians and hospital managers is a recurrent
theme in studies of healthcare organizations [30–32].
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Specifically, it has been reported in other settings that
physicians were marginally involved in PSRA practices.
For example, in a Ugandan hospital, it was reported that
the PSRA process had minimal involvement of frontline
staff and was dominated by hospital managers [33, 34].
Power struggles between frontline practitioners and man-
agers who were reluctant to share decision-making power,
and frustration by practitioners when their concerns were
not addressed, were reported to contribute to the non-
participation of practitioners [33]. It has been demon-
strated that the involvement of clinicians in decision
making processes improves healthcare decision making
[35, 36]. While managers and clinicians have differing
values and interests, both are important, and finding a
balance between them is crucial in improving decision
making in healthcare [30].
Power relationships are also seen at the interface
between the hospital managers and the community, with
the latter minimally involved in PSRA processes. In this
case professionals exercise power derived from the
sources described above to minimize the involvement of
community members. The minimal involvement of the
community and patients in the case study hospitals was
attributed in part to community members and patients
being perceived to lack understanding and objectivity.
Minimal involvement of the community in PSRA pro-
cesses for these reasons has also been observed in other
settings [37]. There is increasing recognition however
for the need to incorporate the public in PSRA decision
making [38], with community involvement considered to
strengthen legitimacy of the process and system ac-
countability. The views and the needs of the community
are also arguably better represented if the public is
involved. The incorporation of community views is how-
ever not without challenges. These include difficulties in
defining communities, identifying legitimate represen-
tatives, lack of role clarity, low capacity to participate
effectively, and few resources to facilitate engagement
mechanisms, among others [39, 40].
These findings reinforce the political frame which
views organizations as coalitions comprised of individ-
uals and groups with enduring differences in values and
interests, living in a world of scarce resources, where
power and conflict are at the center of organizational
decision making [7]. It emphasizes the importance of
getting the institutional settings right, so as to ensure
that PSRA processes are not dominated by any particu-
lar interest and that the relevant set of actors effectively
contribute to decision making. In the case of public
hospitals in Kenya, a first step would be to develop clear
decision making structures and enhance clarity about
the roles of these structures. The lack of role clarity
meant that while actual budgeting decisions were made
in the EEC in one of the case study hospitals, they were
made in the HMT in the second case study hospital.
Given that the EEC was comprised of a small group of
senior managers, while the HMT was comprised of a
larger group of both senior and middle level managers,
the latter is considered a more inclusive forum for deci-
sion making. It has been shown however, that inviting
the relevant range of actors into decision making pro-
cesses does not necessarily translate into effective in-
volvement [41]. There is still the need to put in place
measures that ensure that these actors are empowered
to participate. First, there should be explicit require-
ments that allocation decisions can only be made if a
specified quorum of relevant actors (senior managers,
middle level managers, frontline clinicians and commu-
nity representatives) is represented. Second, the institu-
tional setting should be such that each stakeholder has
equal opportunities (through representation) to partici-
pate at different stages of the decision making process;
these include establishing procedural rules, agenda set-
ting, selecting the expertise and information to inform
the process and providing an assessment of the validity
of information. Third, the roles of each stakeholder
should be clearly defined and enshrined in PSRA rules
and guidelines. Fourth, relevant information should be
accessible to each stakeholder to reduce information
asymmetries. Finally, there should also be ongoing rather
than one off or infrequent engagement of stakeholders
since it has been shown that ongoing engagement builds
trust over time [42, 43]. To make these recommenda-
tions more practical, participation by stakeholders could
be through representation. For example, it would be more
practical to have a representative of different cadres of
hospital staff, such as doctors, rather than all doctors in
the hospital participate in budgeting processes. Further,
the extent of stakeholder engagement and involvement
could be adapted to the nature and scope of PSRA deci-
sions. For example, major PSRA processes such as hos-
pital strategic planning or budgeting would require wider
stakeholder engagement compared to staff allocation deci-
sions within a hospital department.
Beyond developing structures that minimize power
differences and encourage inclusive processes, these
findings also highlight the importance of agency. Power
differences were minimized in Hospital B largely because
the hospital superintendent encouraged inclusiveness
and deliberation among actors in the hospital PSRA
process. Strengthening the leadership in hospitals is
therefore also an important intervention [25]. An im-
portant role of leadership in healthcare settings is man-
aging actor relations and balancing power dynamics in
decision making processes so as to ensure that every
actor has a chance to participate [28]. Skills such as the
ability to mentor and motivate staff, awareness and
appreciation of deliberative processes, the ability to
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manage relationships and build trust among actors
should therefore be surfaced as important skills for hos-
pital managers. It is unlikely that these “soft skills” will
be developed by the formal “classroom type” leadership
and management trainings [44]. These skills can be bet-
ter learnt through doing, reviewing the situation care-
fully and working on how the learning can be built on
for next time [45]. One approach that has been proposed
as a tool for the development of soft leadership skills is
action or collaborative learning [44, 46]. Action learning
programmes are typically tailored to focus on the issues
facing the organization and combine formal training
with on the job mentoring, employing assignments and
reflections from work experiences to achieve learning
[47]. In this approach, learning is not transmitted from
teacher to student but rather co-produced by the in-
teractions and engagements between the facilitators
and the leaders with real life situation. There are still
questions however about the scalability and affordabil-
ity of such initiatives [44]. Another approach that has
been promoted as a tool for leadership development
is coaching. Leadership coaching has been defined as
“a helping relationship formed between a client who
has managerial authority and responsibility in an
organization and a coach who uses a wide variety of
behavioral techniques and methods to help the client
achieve a mutually identified set of goals to improve
his or her professional performance and personal sat-
isfaction, and consequently to improve the effective-
ness of the client’s organization within a formally
defined coaching agreement” [48]. It is an interactive
process that provides a safe place for reflection and
learning, thereby enabling empowerment, learning and
performance improvements [49].
Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed and presented the in-
fluence of micro-practices of power in PSRA pro-
cesses using two public hospitals in Kenya as case
studies. The findings emphasize the need to put in
place institutional measures to minimize the effect of
power differences among the relevant range of actors
in PSRA processes. They also emphasize the need to
develop the leadership skills of hospital managers,
beyond hard skills such as planning, budgeting, and
organization, to include soft skills that enable them to
motivate and build trust among staff, promote delib-
erative processes and manage power dynamics among
actors in hospital PSRA processes. Further, the mech-
anisms of engaging the community in hospital priority
setting decisions should be strengthened, as well as
the communities capacity to effectively participate in
decision making.
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